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THE RECENT AND UNUSUAL EVOLUTION
OF AN EXPANDING FCPA
JOHN ASHCROFT* & JOHN RATCLIFFE"
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1977, the United States Congress passed the U.S. Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA")' following a series of corruption
scandals highlighted by the Watergate investigation and the
resulting resignation of President Richard Nixon.' While Water-
gate itself highlighted political corruption, the investigation shed
a corresponding light on corporate corruption and bribery. Dur-
ing its search through records for illegal political contributions,
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") uncov-
ered more than 400 American companies engaged in making
bribes and other corrupt payments to officials in foreign govern-
ments around the world.' A morally incensed American public
stirred Congress to address corporate governance concerns
through FCPA legislation intended "to restore public confidence
in the integrity of the American business system."'
* Attorney General of the United States, 2001-2005; United States Sena-
tor, 1994-2001; Governor of Missouri, 1985-1993.
** Served in various positions for the United States Department of Jus-
tice from 2004-2008, including United States Attorney for the Eastern District
of Texas in 2007-2008.
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat.
1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff, 78m, 78o
(2006)). The FCPA of 1977 was subsequently amended by the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107,
1415-25 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78dd-1 to -2, 78ff, and 78m (2006)) and
the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78dd-1 to -3, and 78ff
(2006)).
2. See, e.g., Carolyn Lindsey, More Than You Bargained For: Successor Liability
Under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 35 OHio N.U. L. Ricv. 959, 961 (2009)
("The FCPA arose out of the Watergate scandal in the 1970s. While investigat-
ing contributions to Richard Nixon's re-election campaign, Congress discov-
ered that over 400 U.S. companies had paid bribes in excess of $300 million
through offshore slush funds in order to win contracts overseas.").
3. Id.
4. Fraud Section, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act;
Antibribery Provisions, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-
persons-guide.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2012).
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Despite its noble intent, over the first several decades of its
existence the FCPA remained a largely unenforced and nearly
dormant piece of legislation.' In the last few years, however, the
number of FCPA prosecutions has skyrocketed and the payment
of hundreds of millions of dollars in penalties or fines has been
the routine, almost commonplace result of such investigations.'
Senior officials for the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ")
acknowledge that these outcomes are by no means accidental
and have gone so far as to declare the FCPA to be second only to
the prevention of terrorism as an agency priority.' The FCPA's
meteoric rise in prominence now presents perhaps the most
imposing challenge-or some argue, menacing threat-to cor-
porate governance in America today.
II. GENESIS FOR THE RECENT FCPA Boom
The FCPA, forming part of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, has two primary components: (1) prohibitions against the
bribery of foreign officials and (2) requirements for accounting
and recordkeeping provisions.' The anti-bribery provisions gen-
erally prohibit both U.S. and foreign companies from paying any-
thing of value to a foreign official in order to obtain or retain
business.' The accounting and recordkeeping provisions require
that companies devise and maintain internal controls and proce-
dures that sufficiently monitor accounts and records with "rea-
sonable detail" so that such accounts and records accurately
reflect financial transactions.'
5. See Dionne Searcey, U.S. Cracks Down on Corporate Bribes, WA.I. ST. J.,
May 26, 2009, at Al.
6. See David Elesinmogun et al., From the Experts: Secret Agents Causing FCPA
Violations, CORPORATE COUNSEL. (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/
PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202517144907 ("In recent years, the number of FCPA
prosecutions has skyrocketed, with penalties routinely exceeding $100
m illion . . . .").
7. See, e.g., Don Lee, Doing Sticky Business in China; A Pasadena Firm Gets
Caught Up in a Market Rife With Corruption, L.A. Timis,Jan. 12, 2009, at Al; Chris
Colbridge et al., New Bumps and Tolls along the Road to FCPA Settlements, KIRKIEAND
& Ei.i.is LLP (Nov. 1, 2009), http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?content
ID=223&iternld=2929.
8. The FCPA anti-bribery provisions were incorporated into § 30A of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), and the financial reporting
and internal controls provisions were incorporated into §§ 13(b)(2)(A) and
(B) of the Exchange Act. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat.
881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a - 78kk (2006)).
9. 15. U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (1) (A) (i) (2006).
10. 15. U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2) (A)-(B) (2006).
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The DOJ and SEC have divided enforcement authority over
various aspects of the FCPA." The DOJ is responsible for all
criminal enforcement of the FCPA as well as civil enforcement
actions brought against entities that are not "issuers" under the
statute.' 2 Since the SEC has only civil enforcement authority, its
jurisdiction is limited to regulating issuers, including their direc-
tors, officers, employees, and agents, under the U.S.
Exchanges.' 3
From 1977 to 2006, the DOJ and SEC rarely brought more
than a few, isolated cases each year.' 4 Since that time, however,
enforcement of the FCPA has dramatically surged at exponential
rates.'" Illustrative of this point, the total number of FCPA cases
brought by the DOJ and SEC from 2007 to 2009 more than
doubled the total of all such cases brought in the statute's first 30
years.'" In 2010, FCPA prosecutions nearly doubled again."
While a discrete number of factors and events likely contributed
to the genesis of this stunning increase in FCPA enforcement
activity, arguably, the most significant of these occurred during
the early years of the George W. Bush Administration.
III. SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE FCPA
Corporate governance is not a subject typically associated
with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 ("9/11"). It was
certainly not a consideration at the forefront of DOJ officials'
consciousness as strategies and initiatives aimed at improving the
federal government's ability to prevent future acts of terrorism
on U.S. soil were devised in the aftermath of that terrible day.
11. See S. REiP. No. 95-114, at 11-12 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4098, 4109-10 (discussing FCPA enforcement duties of the DOJ and SEC).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2) (2006) (applying accounting provisions to
"[e]very issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 781
of this title and every issuer which is required to file reports pursuant to section
78o(d) of this title.").
13. Id.
14. See Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation:
The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REzv. 489, 495
(2011).
15. Roger M. Witten et al., Prescriptions for Compliance with the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act: Identifying Bribery Risks and Implementing Anti-Bribery Controls in
Pharmaceutical and Life Sciences Companies, 64 Bus. LAw. 691, 692 (2009) (stating
that the number of FCPA enforcement actions have "skyrocketed").
16. See Westbrook, supra note 14, at 495-96.
17. See Melissa Aguilar, 2010 PCPA Enforcement Shatters Records, COMPLI-
ANCE WEEK Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.complianceweek.com/2010-fcpa-
enforcement-shatters-records/article/193665/ (citing statistics that 2010 FCPA
enforcement nearly doubling 2009 totals against individuals and rose by 85 per-
cent overall).
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Accordingly, with the passage of the USA PATRIOT ACT's occur-
ring just a few weeks later, the DOJ dramatically changed its
enforcement priorities and strategies so as to elevate the preven-
tion of terrorism as its overriding priority.
This seismic shift was not limited to law enforcement activity
within the United States. The horrific events of 9/11 quickly led
to unprecedented levels of cooperation between and among gov-
ernments around the globe which understood that coordinated,
multinational investigations were likely to be the most effective
means of preventing similar acts of terrorism from occurring in
other major cities around the world. Prior to 9/11, only four
countries had ratified the international treaty on the suppression
of terrorism financing.'" Today, 174 nation-states are signatories
to that convention.o
These cooperative efforts increased information-sharing and
lowered the traditional border-related barriers between law
enforcement authorities in different countries. While such inter-
national cooperation was originally intended as a means to pre-
vent terrorism, and, more specifically, to control the flow of
money to terrorist organizations throughout the world, countries
soon began to realize that the extension of these coordinated
investigations into other areas of criminal activity could provide
significant alternative benefits.
Moreover, U.S. authorities learned that the financing of ter-
rorism was often linked to, and even facilitated by, the corrup-
tion of foreign officials. 2 ' As a result, considerable efforts were
dedicated to improving the DOJ's ability to investigate and prose-
cute corrupt officials on a worldwide basis. In December 2003,
the United States became an initial signatory to the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption along with the repre-
sentatives of 96 other countries. 2 Cooperation between DOJ
18. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT ACT) of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 8, 12,
15, 18, 21, 22, 28, 31, 42, 47, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).
19. See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999); Signa-
tory Status of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terror-
ism, UN, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg..no=
XVIII-11&chapter=18&lang=en (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Louise I. Shelley &John T. Picarell, Methods Not Motives: Anpli-
cations of the Convergence of International Organized Crime and Terrorism, 3 Poi.icie
PiAcwric & RESvARC-i 305, 305-06 (2002).
22. See United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime, Signatories to the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption (Nov. 25, 2011), http://www.unodc.org/
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and America's international partners became critical not only to
the disruption of terrorist organizations and activities but also to
collaboration efforts aimed at reducing other criminal activities.
Due to the very nature of FCPA cases, successful prosecution
is difficult, and sometimes impossible, without the kind of inter-
national collaboration that evolved after 9/11. Because evi-
dence, documentation, and witnesses necessary to support
allegations of bribes or corrupt payments are often physically
located on foreign soil, many FCPA violations simply cannot be
pursued without the cross-border cooperation between various
national authorities.
This continued cooperation in the expansion of FCPA
enforcement remains evident today. DOJ has resident advisors
in 37 countries that are supported by Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation ("FBI") agents in 75 foreign cities." Similarly, the SEC is
a party to an international, multilateral memorandum of under-
standing with twenty other foreign securities commissions." The
result is an increasing trend of FCPA dispositions through the
closely coordinated, joint efforts of U.S. and non-U.S. regulators,
a development recently acknowledged and praised by the Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation and Development." The
recent prosecutions of Siemens AG, BAE Systems PLC, Alcatel-
Lucent, Innospec, and others are the result of, and testament to,
unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html; Press Release, United Nations Con-
vention Against Corruption (Dec. 10, 2003), http://www.un.org/webcast/
merida/statements/pressrelease2-eng.htm (quoting United States Attorney
GeneralJohn Ashcroft, "The United Nations Convention against Corruption we
are signing today is a permanent enshrinement of the new global attitude
toward corruption. Corruption is now unacceptable in any form, and interna-
tional cooperation is considered a key element of our respective efforts to com-
bat this scourge"); Press Release, Signing of the UN Convention Against
Corruption (Dec. 10, 2003), http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/27
056.htm.
23. Ass't Att'y Gen. Lanny A. Breuer, Address at Columbia Law School:
The Global Case forJustice: Protecting Human Rights and Promoting the Rule
of Law (Oct. 7, 2009), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/criminal/icitap/pr/
2009/10-07-09breuer-speech.pdf; Legal Attach Offices, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/
contact-us/legat/legal-offices (last visited Jan. 5. 2012).
24. Cooperative Agreements with Foreign Regulators, SEC, http://www.sec.
gov/about/offices/oia/oiacooparrangements.shtml (last visited Jan. 5, 2012).
25. See DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPIERA
TION & DEV., UNITED STATES: PHASE 3; REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CON-
VENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 2009 REVISED RECOMMENDATION ON COMBAT-
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the profound impact that 9/11 brought to international coopera-
tion in FCPA enforcement.2 6
IV. SARBANES-OXLEY, ARTHUR ANDERSEN, AND DPAs
On the heels of 9/11, the United States was forced to
endure another wave of scandals involving corporate America.
The American public discovered that many of the companies
that enjoyed such astronomical growth in stock value during the
"dotcom" boom years of the mid-1990s and into early 2000 had
accomplished their unprecedented success by engaging in
accounting fraud and stock manipulation at the highest levels of
corporate leadership and governance. The highly publicized
financial collapses and subsequent prosecutions of senior corpo-
rate executives of Enron, WorldCom, and Adelphia highlighted
these types of scandals.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX")2 7 was enacted by
Congress as a direct counter-measure intended to remedy and
prevent such types of corporate misbehavior. By requiring,
among other things, that companies maintain internal controls
for financial reporting and mandating that corporate executives
certify the accuracy of such financial reporting and records, SOX
has immeasurably influenced most aspects of corporate govern-
ance.2 ' This is especially true regarding the increasing number
of voluntary disclosures of FCPA violations. Because SOX
requires officers to disclose to the board of directors "any fraud,
whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the issuer's internal con-
trols," there are any number of FCPA violations-including
26. See FCPA/Anti-Bribery Spring Alert 2011, HUGHEs HUBBARD & REDn
L.L.P. 2 (June 2011), http://www.htigheshubbard.coin/files/upload/fcpa-anti-
bribery-alert -spring_2011.pdf (commenting on increasing international coop-
eration between U.S. and international regulators on FCPA cases including Sie-
mens AG, BAE Systems PLC, Innospec, and others).
27. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); see Mary Kreiner
Ramirez,Just in Crime: Guiding Economic Crime Reform After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 34 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 359, 361 (2003) (commenting that "[i]n response to
the corporate and accounting scandals that began with Enron, but appear to
have no end in sight, the legislature attempted to restore faith in America's
financial markets by enacting new criminal statues and mandating stiffer penal-
ties for economic crimes").
28. See Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of
SOX 404, 29 CARDozo L. REv. 703, 706 (2007).
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improper payments to foreign officials-which must be
disclosed.29
However, a still more profound factor in the FCPA's expan-
sive enforcement also originated from these scandals-the
proliferation of deferred prosecution agreements ("DPAs") and
other "pretrial diversions" in the wake of Arthur Andersen's
demise.3 0 As part of regulators' investigation into Enron, the
DOJ became aware that the company's accounting firm, Arthur
Andersen, ordered the shredding of millions of documents relat-
ing to Enron's auditing and accounting records."' In March
2002, Arthur Andersen was indicted on charges of obstruction of
justice.32
As commentators have observed, the indictment of Arthur
Andersen proved to be a death sentence for the company.33 The
months subsequent to the charges led to the displacement of
28,000 employees and the eventual shuttering of doors at one of
the world's oldest and largest accounting firms. During such
time, there was considerable debate within the DOJ as to the
legal, practical, and moral consequences of indictments against
corporate defendants. Those discussions emphasized that while
corporate wrongdoers needed to be brought to justice, regula-
tors also needed to carefully consider the collateral conse-
quences of corporate prosecutions.
One of the bedrock principles of administering justice in
America is to avoid causing serious harm to innocent bystanders.
In the context of corporate wrongdoing, a DPA can provide an
alternate resolution that punishes a company while avoiding the
loss of jobs, pensions, and investments of innocent parties who
were neither aware of, nor played any role in, the criminal con-
29. 15 U.S.C. §7241(a) (5) (B) (2006); see Laura E. Kress, Note, How the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act has Knocked the "SOX" off the DO] and SEC and Kept the FCPA on
Its Feet, 10 U. Prrr. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 2, 3-5 (2009).
30. "[A] deferred prosecution agreement is typically predicated upon the
filing of a formal charging document by the government, and the agreement is
filed with the appropriate court. In the non-prosecution agreement context,
formal charges are not filed and the agreement is maintained by the parties
rather than being filed with a court." Memorandum from Craig S. Morford to
the Heads of Dep't Components and United States Attorneys, 1 n.2 (Mar. 7,
2008), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/dag/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-
03072008.pdf. In this Essay all such diversion agreements are referred to gener-
ally as DPAs.
31. See, e.g., Ken Brown et al., Called to Account: Indictment of Andersen in
Shredding Case Puts Its Future in Question, WAL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2002, at Al, A4.
32. Indictment, at 7, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, No. CRH-02-
121 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2002).
33. See Brown et al., supra note 31.
31
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duct, and who could thus do nothing to prevent or minimize it.
The harm suffered by so many innocent people in prosecuting
the misconduct of so few is the tragedy of the Arthur Andersen
experience.
While not new, for most of the history of American jurispru-
dence, pretrial diversion agreements, like DPAs, were limited to
individuals accused of criminal conduct. 4 It was not until the
1990s that such agreements were first utilized, albeit sparingly, by
the DOJ in connection with resolving criminal charges against
corporate defendants." Further, federal prosecutors did not
have the benefit of advisory guidelines to help determine the
appropriateness of DPAs until 1999."
In January 2003, DOJ issued the first binding "Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations" for use by federal
prosecutors determining whether to charge corporations with
criminal offenses. 7 The "Thompson Memo," as it is more com-
monly known, allowed for resolution through DPAs and other
pretrial diversion agreements where corporations demonstrated,
among other things, authentic cooperation with law enforce-
ment through internal compliance and other corporate govern-
ance measures.
After the Arthur Andersen experience, the DOJ viewed
DPAs as an effective means of mandating improved corporate
governance and, in so doing, restoring confidence in the market-
place without destroying the corporations and jobs that provide a
market in the first place. While the Thompson Memo was issued
in the wake of securities fraud and accounting fraud scandals, its
decision making framework for prosecutors applied to all areas
of corporate criminal conduct, including, among others, anti-
trust, health care fraud, environmental crimes, and enforcement
34. Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the 'New Regulators': Current
Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 ANt. CRIM. L. Ri-v. 159, 163 (2008)
(noting that deferred prosecution has existed for many decades in the prosecu-
tion of individual federal defendants).
35. Id. at 164 (discussing that diversion agreements were utilized in only
ten corporate cases during the 1990s).
36. See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att'y Gen., to All
Component Heads & United States Attorneys (June 16, 1999), available at
http://wwwjustice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-
corps.PDF ("Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations").
37. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads
of Dep't Components & United States Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-giiidelines.htim ("Principles of Fed-
eral Prosecution of Business Organizations").
38. Id. at preface.
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of the FCPA. As discussed, infra, its impact on the latter of these
has been as significant as it has been controversial.
V. THE UNusuAL EVOLUTION OF THE FCPA
While it was certainly not written for the express purpose of
proliferating FCPA enforcement actions, the impact of the
Thompson Memo regarding such enforcements cannot be
ignored. Following its issuance in 2003, diversion agreements
have been used to resolve the vast majority of FCPA enforcement
actions involving corporate defendants." The role that DPAs
and other diversion agreements have played in the accelerated
expansion of FCPA enforcement activity by both the DOJ and the
SEC is appropriately the subject of current debate.
In this regard, some argue that FCPA "law" is improperly
developing through the terms and conditions of DPAs, rather
than by the jury verdicts and appellate court decisions that shape
the majority of criminal prosecutions.4 There is statistical sup-
port for this concern-prior to the Lindsey Manufacturing verdict
in May 2011, every FCPA enforcement action against a corpo-
rate entity since 1991 had been resolved through some type of
diversion agreement, plea, or SEC resolution.4 2 As a result, some
commentators contend that the FCPA, as an area of law being
39. Spivack & Raman, supra note 34, at 176; see also Mike Koehler, DOJ
Prosecution of Individuals - Are Other Factors at Play?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 22,
2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-prosecution-of-individuals-are-other-
factors-at-play (discussing that since 2004, DPAs and NPAs have been used to
resolve 77% of FCPA cases).
40. See, e.g., The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2-3
(June 14, 2011) (written testimony of Michael B. Mukasey) [hereinafter
"Mukasey Testimony"], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
Mukasey06142011.pdf; Justin F. Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, A Little More
Action: Evaluating and Forecasting the Trend of More Frequent and Severe Prosecutions
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 285, 310
(2007).
41. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, California Company, Its Two
Executives and Intermediary Convicted by Federal Jury in Los Angeles on All
Counts For Their Involvement in Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned
Electrical Utility in Mexico (May 10, 2011), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/
opa/pr/201 1/May/i 1-crm-596.html.
42. See Corporate Defendant Lindsey Manufacturing Tried and Convicted on
FCPA Charges (Along with 3 Other Individuals), FED. SEc. LAw BLOG (May 11,
2011), http://www.fedseclaw.com/2011/05/articles/foreign-corrupt-practices-
act-i /corporate-defendant-lindsey-manufacturing-tried-and-convicted-on-fcpa-
charges-along-with-3-other-individuals/#axzzli2Y9Wzse; Mike Koehler, The
Facade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 907, 927 (2010) (stating that "no
company has challenged the DOJ in an FCPA enforcement action in the last
twenty years").
33
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created outside of the normal judicial process with little judicial
scrutiny, is providing far too much interpretive power to DOJ
and SEC prosecutors to set precedents based solely upon unilat-
eral demands on corporate defendants."3
According to some, this unbridled power has allowed prose-
cutors to become corporate governance bullies, forcing corpo-
rate defendants to accept the government's interpretation of the
FCPA-no matter how unreasonable or dubious it may appear to
be.4" Because protesting such questionable interpretations in a
court of law would first require a company to be criminally
indicted-thus placing its entire business future at risk-critics
contend that the company is left between the proverbial rock
and a hard place with no real choice but to accept whatever fines,
penalties, or other requirements prosecutors choose to impose
upon it."1
These are concerns worthy of consideration. Due to the
absence of any substantial case law after more than 34 years, even
the most basic elements of the FCPA, like what constitutes a
"bribe" or who is considered a "foreign official," remain largely
undefined." As a result, it would appear that prosecutors are
unfettered in their discretion to extend the boundaries of FCPA
interpretation to fit the facts and circumstances of any particular
investigation. While it is understood that laws are rarely black
and white, our adversarial system of justice is not well served
when the roles of prosecutor and judge are combined, and
where the resulting law remains perpetually gray. For corporate
America, the dilemma is obvious-it is difficult for any company
to ensure that its employees and business partners will act ethi-
cally and legally when it is unclear which actions will trigger an
FCPA violation.
While some commentators and interested parties suggest
that Congressional or judicial intervention17 is the most appro-
43. Mukasey Testimony, supra note 40, at 8-10.
44. Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its
Decade of Resurgence, 43 INo. L. Riv. 389, 412-13 (2010) (discussing various DOJ
and SEC legal interpretations of "foreign official" as "tenuous and dubious").
45. Marceau, supra note 40, at 310.
46. SeeJames R. Doty, Toward a Reg. FCPA: A Modest Proposal for Change in
Administering the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 Bus. LAw. 1233, 1233-38 (2007)
(discussing a lack of guidance and interpretation of the FCPA).
47. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, RESTORING BAIANCF:
PRoPOSED AMENOMENTS To THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICEs ACT 7 (2010),
available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/sites/default/files/restor-
ingbalance-fcpa.pdf (calling for Congress to adopt various measures to reform
the FCPA); Ellen S. Podgor, If the FCPA is Sick, judicial Review is the Medicine,
FCPA Bioc (June 15, 2011, 5:36 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/
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priate or effective means to remedy the questionable application
of FCPA authority, it would be neither unprecedented nor
unreasonable to expect the primary initiative for change to come
from the enforcement authorities involved. Perhaps ironically,
the evolution of the Thompson Memo is instructive on this issue.
While even its harshest critics concede that the Thompson
Memo succeeded in achieving its stated objectives of increasing
corporate cooperation with law enforcement and improving cor-
porate compliance programs, it nevertheless engendered much
criticism in the first years of its application by DOJ prosecutors.
These criticisms or concerns involved, among other things, the
waiver of attorney-client privileges, the payment of attorneys' fees
for culpable employees, and approval of court-appointed federal
monitors in the context of diversion agreements.
In response to legitimate concerns regarding the equitable
application of federal policy, the DOJ is obligated to "self-police"
its own conduct as part of the agency's stated mission "to ensure
fair and impartial administration of justice."so The Thompson
Memo has repeatedly been subjected to such internal scrutiny, as
evidenced by subsequent revisions issued in 2006 and 2008,
which altered various aspects of corporate charging decisions
and authority." With each revision, the DOJ attempted to pro-
vide increased clarity, transparency, and fairness to the corporate
charging process by adding more restrictions and limitations on
prosecutorial discretion and by providing deterrents to potential
prosecutorial abuse.
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For the reasons discussed, the existing version of the DOJ's
corporate charging policy is likely contributing to the develop-
ment of an important law in a manner that is at the very least
atypical, if not arguably one-sided. In response, both the DOJ
and SEC have an obligation to collaborate with others in evaluat-
ing the merits of increasing and sustained complaints that the
pendulum of prosecutorial discretion and authority in the con-
text of FCPA enforcement has swung too far.
VI. FUTURE ENFORCEMENT OF THE FCPA
Not to be lost in this discussion is the fact that when prop-
erly enforced, the FCPA is an effective means of protecting com-
petition in a marketplace that becomes increasingly global with
each passing day. Any honest examination of the FCPA should
not merely identify flaws in its current implementation, but also
recognize how FCPA enforcement has played a leading role in
reducing corruption throughout the world. Many countries have
recently passed-either based upon or in direct response to the
FCPA-laws that criminalize bribery and other business corrup-
tion." In that respect, the FCPA has inspired a worldwide crack-
down on corrupt business practices that have historically put U.S.
companies at a competitive disadvantage.
The FCPA prosecution of Siemens AG provides vivid proof
that such positive changes have occurred. Until 1999, the Ger-
man government not only allowed bribery in business transac-
tions, but actually rewarded such practices. German
corporations like Siemens AG received government subsidies in
the form of tax deductions for bribery payments made in further-
ance of business transactions.5 4 Similar enforcement actions by
other foreign governments to reverse their respective stances and
punish rather than reward bribery reflects the influence of the
FCPA on international business. The notion that the FCPA can
help "level the playing field" for American companies in the
international marketplace is further evidenced by the fact that
52. Eugene S. Erbstoesser et al., The FCPA and Analogous Foreign Anti-brib-
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eight out of the ten largest FCPA settlements in history involved
non-U.S. companies.5 5
Progress in these respects should provide some measure of
relief to the broad range of corporate executives who have no
choice but to swim in FCPA waters. With today's technological
capabilities, the days of international business being limited to
companies in a select few industries, such as energy and finance,
are forever gone. Corporations of every size and in every busi-
ness sector are now pursuing opportunities abroad not always by
choice but often out of necessity.
The accompanying risks inherent in conducting such inter-
national business, however, also appear to be rising rather than
waning, as documented by the sharp increases in FCPA prosecu-
tions over the past few years. With the combined factors of tough
global financial conditions, governments struggling to create rev-
enue, the enactment of increased whistleblower rewards," and a
public appetite for corporate fraud prosecutions, there is noth-
ing to indicate a decline in this trend anytime soon.
In addition to the raw numbers of FCPA investigations and
prosecutions, there is other evidence to support the projection
that aggressive and vigorous enforcement by both the DOJ and
the SEC will continue. In 2010, the SEC created its own stand-
alone FCPA enforcement unit." In addition, both agencies are
bolstering their investigative activity through the use of tech-
niques previously limited to fighting organized crime, such as
wiretaps, informers, and surveillance." These actions reinforce
the view that both the DOJ and the SEC will continue to make
FCPA prosecutions a priority long into the future.
VII. CONCLUSION
The ability of American corporations of integrity not only to
compete, but to thrive without corrupt behavior, is enhanced by
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the FCPA. If bribery in international business had been allowed
to continue virtually unchecked, as was occurring before the vig-
orous enforcement of the FCPA, it would likely have impeded
the strengthening of governments and free market economies
worldwide. If the United States is to maintain its standing as the
leader of the world's free market economies, corporate America
must endorse the continued enforcement of the FCPA as an
effective tool against bribery and corruption. However, U.S.
enforcement authorities should constantly be sensitive to the risk
of injustice inherent in the enforcement of a law with opaque
boundaries. We should avoid fueling a conclusion that the FCPA
is a foe, not a friend, to the ability of American corporations to
succeed in the global economy.
